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I. CLASSIFICATION: THE CONFUSION OF COMMINGLING'
A search of the Lexis and Westlaw databases confirms that the terms
commingle, commingling, or commingled2 do not appear in the text of the
Louisiana Civil Code. The words also do not appear in any provision of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes relating to classification of assets as separate or
community. One hears the terms, of course, and some courts use them to
support classifications of assets as community. However, there exists no simple,
general substantive rule that provides that just because community funds or assets
are combined with separate funds or assets, the resulting mass is a community
asset. The imprecise use of the concept masks much more complex consider-
ations and rules.3 Its use can produce results that, despite attempts to promote
what a judge or court may consider equitable, are bizarre and often inequitable.
If not bizarre, the results are at least inconsistent with the legislation. An
example of the problem this term is Jones v. Jones.4
A. The Decision in Light of the Legislation
Two quotations from the Jones opinion state the problem succinctly:
Prior to the marriage Mr. Jones had a piece of property that he paid less
than $26,000.00 for. After the renovation and addition, completed over
the course of the marriage, the property appraised for $240,000.00, 5
[and]
[w]e find that the record supports a finding that the Valmont Street
property changed classification from separate property to community
property as a result of a pattern of commingling and treating the
property as a community asset throughout the marriage.6
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The basic term, mingle, should be enough to indicate mixing of things. However, the term
co-mingle (to mingle together) developed presumably to emphasize the complexity of the process.
The modem spelling is "commingle." See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage
125 (Oxford 1987).
2. Both computerized services were searched on October 4, 1993, for the terms "commingle,"
"commingled," and "commingling."
3. Katherine S. Spaht and W. Lee -Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes §§ 3.23, 3.28, 3.40, in 16
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989).
4. 611 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 193 (1993).
5. Jones, 611 So. 2d at 196. The house was purchased by the husband-to-be in May, 1974, and
the parties were married in 1979. The petition for separation was filed in October, 1981.
6. Id. at 195.
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The court concedes that the husband's house was a separate asset acquired before
marriage. The court does not point to any contract between the spouses that
would have transformed the house into community property. 7 The standard
solution thus is simple. The house remained separate property, and if any
community funds or common labor were used to improve it, equity is accom-
plished by requiring compensation in money to the wife. Louisiana Civil Code
article 2366 applies to the use of community funds, providing reimbursement for
half the funds used. Article 2368 applies to the uncompensated common labor
of either spouse, setting the compensation at one-half of the value of the
increase attributable to the common labor. The 1980 reform legislation does not
change the prior law's basic concept of providing fairness and equity8 by
allowing a personal claim against the other spouse, rather than by changing the
classification of the asset.
Under these legislative principles, it should make no difference that the wife-
to-be in Jones, an architect, spent substantial time before the marriage planning
and assisting in the remodeling of the house. One or both of the parties may
have had desires to make the house co-owned property, as was argued. But at
that time, no documents were executed that would meet the form requirements
for donation of an immovable. 9 Indeed, the records of the case do not support
an assertion of the theory that the asset changed classification by operation of
law. The wife's initial request was to enforce an oral contract to compensate her
for the work she did. It was a request for a money judgment rather than a
declaration of co-ownership.'0 She also alleged that she worked on remodeling
the house during the marriage. However, her main argument was that the
property became community by virtue of a donation from the husband. She
testified that she threatened not to marry him if he did not make her a co-owner,
and, "[s]he married him based on his assurance that he would make her a co-
owner."" The husband did not follow through with an agreement that would
clearly meet the formalities required for a donation of immovable property.
Some argument was made that the formalities were met, but the court nonethe-
less does not rest on them, maintaining that issue was moot in light of its finding
the property a community asset.
Thus, the court's rationale is that a separate asset became a community asset
by operation of law because of the use of community funds and common labor
7. The lower court had found-that the former husband's execution of a document purporting to
correct the title to the property by including the ex-wife's name was effective as a donation to her
of half of the property. The court of appeal determined that this conclusion was moot in light of its
holding that the house was community property.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 2408 (1870).
9. La. Civ. Code art. 1536.
10. Even if a long time period passed before the assertion of such a claim, liberative prescription
was suspended during the marriage. La. Civ. Code art. 3469.




to improve the asset. No Civil Code authority supports this proposition. The
court does make a general reference to Article 2388, saying the article "states
that the effort, skill or industry of either spouse is a factor in determining
whether to classify property as a community asset."' 2 True enough, it is a
factor in some cases, but only if, in the terms of the same article, the thing is
"acquired during the existence of the legal regime."' 3 Title to the house was
acquired before the existence of the legal regime, and thus the house is not
within the scope of Article 2338. The court also states that Article 2341 "makes
the classification of separate property as measure of whether the value of
community things used in its acquisition inconsequential as compared to the
value of separate things used."' 4 However, that provision applies only if the
mixture of funds occurs at the time of acquisition. Comment (b) of Article 2341
explains, "The value of the community things at the time of acquisition should
be used for determining whether it is 'inconsequential' in comparison with the
value of the separate things used."'5 At the time of the acquisition of the
house, no community assets were used. None could have been used because
there was no community regime existing at the time.
B. The Decision in Light of Equitable Sharing Concerns
One could try to defend the Jones decision as a "creative" one that produces
a more equitable result, or what the court perceives as a more equitable result,
than the rule supplied by the Code; however the court does not pursue such an
analysis and does not present enough facts to indicate why the traditional
solution would not be equitable.
For example, substantial uncompensated common labor was devoted to
improving the separate property, entitling the wife to half the enhanced value of
the house attributable to that labor.' 6 Under this analysis, both her work and
his work on the house could be determined and valued, not according to its
hourly value, but according to the extent that it enhanced the value of the house.
In this rather diffuse inquiry, one involving substantial discretion on the part of
a judge or a court, there is room to reach an equitable valuation without having
to classify the asset as community.
To the extent that equity requires compensating the wife for her work before
marriage, there is an adequate basis to find, as the wife argued, that there was
a contract to compensate her for her work. If no such contract existed, then
unjust enrichment principles could be called into play. 7
12. Id. at 197.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
14. Jones, 611 So. 2d at 197.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 2341, cmt. (b).
16. La. Civ. Code art. 2368.
17. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1757, 2295.
1994]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
A more realistic equitable problem occurs when community funds are used
to improve the separate asset. Beginning in 1980, the Civil Code provides that
reimbursement is half the community funds used and treats the transaction like
an interest free loan.'8 Thus, in a case in which substantial inflation contributes
to the increase in value of the thing, the separate estate benefits from the
inflation, while the community funds dedicated to improving the separate asset
retain the same value. However, there is in Jones no clear analysis of the
amount of community funds used and no determination of inflationary increase.
Indeed, the Jones marriage was not a long one. Married in 1979 and separated
in 1981, the marriage hardly seems to be one in which there existed long term
reliance between husband and wife on each other's representations and informal
habits. Moreover, a substantial inflationary increase in the separate asset seems
unlikely to have occurred within as short a time period as two years.
At the least, principled decision making requires that a court explain clearly
its justification for departing from a clear statutory command, especially when
the court had available other devices to promote equity and was dealing with a
recent statutory change. Before 1980, if community funds were used to improve
a separate asset, the community reimbursement was not based on the funds used,
but on the amount of the enhanced value of the separate asset attributable to
those funds. In such a case, the increase in value attributable to inflation could
be apportioned between the two patrimonies involved. The change in 1980 was
a deliberate one to treat such use of community funds as an interest free loan.
If the result is inequity, it seems to be statutorily compelled inequity based on
a clear policy choice. 9
C. Why Worry About It?
Decision making such as that employed in the Jones case raises basic
jurisprudential questions about the powers of judges and their obligations to
follow legislation. On a more practical, structural level, the approach in Jones
results in serious difficulties. These difficulties result from the fact that
Louisiana, unlike some marital property states,20 has a true community property
system in which classification of assets affects more than division of the
community at divorce. A divorce was at issue here, and it can be argued that
even some community property states might decide in accord with Jones.2 But
18. La. Civ. Code art. 2366, cmt. (b).
19. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 3, § 7.15.
20. Id. § 24.
21. See Stephen S. Case, Property-Owned by the Decedent and Powers of Appointment, C804
ALI-ABA 29 (1993); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 46 SMU L. Rev. 1475
(1993); Thomas R. Andrews, Separate Property: Towards a Theoretical Foundation, 56 SPG Law
& Contemp. Probs. 171 (1993); Richard W. Mollerup, Improvements to Real Property During
Marriage: It's Time for Idaho to Make a Decision, 28 Idaho L. Rev. 1021 (1992).
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in Louisiana, classification of assets also affects management of the property
during the existence of the regime and affects disposition of property at death.
For example, if one takes the analysis in Jones literally, there was a point
when the separate house became community by operation of law. This
transformation would be so even though the title to the asset was in the
husband's name alone, the sale indicating correctly that the acquisition occurred
before the marriage. The long established conveyancing practice in this state and
the strong public records doctrine 22 would lead third persons to conclude that
the asset was the husband's separate property and could be alienated or
encumbered by the husband acting alone. Any change in the ownership of the
asset, under the legislation, would have to be by agreement, which could not
affect third persons unless it was recorded.23 If the decision in Jones is
followed, and it is accepted that the asset changed classification by the operation
of community property law, that change in classification would not have to be
recorded to affect third persons. Only written agreements must be recorded to
affect third persons, and such changes accomplished without a writing do not
have to be recorded.24 Thus, the risk of harm to third persons is serious.
If the Jones court's analysis is accepted, the question arises as to how a
court should determine the point at which the asset became community. That
point did not have to be ascertained in Jones because the issue was the division
of the asset upon divorce. It becomes relevant in cases involving management
powers. Determining the point at which the asset became community property
leads to an uncertain and amorphous analysis. Presumably, the court would look
at the value of the community labor and funds in comparison with the separate
labor and funds. Again, the third person would be at risk.
More fundamentally, a rule allowing such transmutations of separate assets
could lead to an increasing departure from the community system. Would-be
spouses who legitimately want to keep their separate assets separate would be
encouraged to adopt separate property regimes. If they, and their lawyers, cannot
rely on statutes to provide the clear rules for keeping a separate asset from
becoming community, they will tend to adopt more separate property agreements
to avoid the possibility of such informal transmutations. Post hoc individualized
searches for equity could hurt the community ideal more than help it.
The consequences are also problematic when the Jones analysis is applied
in a case involving the death of a spouse. Jones would allow a separate house
inherited by one spouse to become community through this informal commin-
gling. When the spouse who owned the separate asset died, he could leave only
a one-half interest to his heirs. In the case of a second or third marriage, upon
the death of the surviving spouse, the house could then be co-owned by
22. See William F. Redmann, The Louisiana Law of Recordation: Some Principles and Some
Problems, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 49 (1965).
23. Id. at 492.
24. Id. at 502-05.
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stepchildren and thus owned by persons not members of the original family.
25
Such a result occurred in Martinez v. Martinez26 and provoked the legislative
reaction to keep such familial transfers from occurring.2
D. What Was the Court's Authority?
The only case authority the Jones court offers to buttress its conclusion is
the second circuit court of appeal's troublesome decision in Luffey v. Luffey,28
a decision in which two judges dissented and would have granted a rehearing.
The supreme court denied writs, with two justices dissenting. 29 The problem
in Luffey was the classification of stock acquired with the husband's separate
funds. The stock was in a closely-held corporation whose success hinged largely
on the husband's effort and skill and the transfer of a community asset to the
corporation. Under the traditional approach, the funds used to capitalize the
corporation and acquire the stock were the husband's separate property, primarily
consisting of donations from his father. Thus, the stock was separate. No
authority would come into play to change that classification absent some juridical
act so providing.
However, the court in Luffey concluded that "the contributions made by the
community regime were ultimately of greater value. ' 30 These contributions, in
the court's view, included the husband's specialized knowledge, business
contacts, effort, skill and industry. It is difficult to understand how knowledge
can be considered a community asset. The amendment of Civil Code article 161
(now renumbered 121-124) and the comments indicate that knowledge or a
degree is not considered property subject to be shared with a spouse. 3' Effort,
skill and industry produce property that is community (wages), but that fact does
not make the enterprise by which one is employed a community asset. If one
attempts to use one's common labor to increase the value of a separate asset, the
Civil Code provides a remedy in Article 2368, as stated earlier.
Another difficulty with the court's analysis is that it finds a mixture of
separate funds and "community" contributions over a period of time as the
corporation developed. But under Civil Code article 2341, commingling is
relevant only if the separate and community elements are contributed at "the time
of acquisition."
25. Cynthia A. Samuel et al., Successions and Donations, Developments in the Law, 1982-1.983,
45 La. L. Rev. 575 (1984).
26. 602 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 605 So. 2d 1129 (1992).
27. La. Civ. Code art. 2341.1. See also Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, Developments in
the Law, 1990-1991, 52 La. L. Rev. 655 (1992).
28. 572 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 50 (1991). See Spaht &
Hargrave, supra note 3, § 3.40, at 52 (Supp. 1992).
29. Luffey v. Luffey, 577 So. 2d 50 (1991).
30. Luffey, 572 So. 2d at 1050.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 121, cmt. (f).
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The court in Luffey refers to equitable concerns, such as the fact that the
couple bought land anticipating a future business being established, and that the
land was later sold to the corporation. The court considers these acts to be the
use of some type of community resources. In the same way, the spouses both
obligated themselves when $50,000 was borrowed to use in the corporation.
Again, if these obligations are relevant, they involve community funds or
community labor that are used to improve a separate asset. The Civil Code's
mechanism again is reimbursement rather than a change in classification of what
was initially a separate asset.32
Perhaps the court's strongest argument in Luffey comes from its conclusion
that the wife did not know the corporate stock was to be the husband's separate
asset and that she was not represented by counsel when she executed documents
transferring community land to the corporation and when she obligated herself
to loans. These facts might constitute the basis to argue fraud or bad faith by
the husband inthe management of community property. If so, the remedy of
Civil Code article 2354 normally is damages, not classification of the asset as
community. As stated earlier, "[i]f [Luffey's analysis were] taken seriously, it
would be virtually impossible for a spouse to maintain the separate character of
a business interest when that spouse devotes most of his time and effort to
developing that business. 33
Jones is probably more difficult to justify than Luffey because in Luffey,
there was at least an alternate theory based on fraud or bad faith management of
a community asset. Moreover, Jones involves immovable property subject to
joint management, whereas Luffey does not present as serious a management
problem. The registered owner of stock has the authority to manage the asset,
and it'is not necessary to obtain the concurrence of both spouses to protect third
persons.34
The court in Jones does not cite its previous decision in Curtis v. Curtis,35
a case in which the fourth circuit's earlier attempt to depart from the Code rules
in the name of equity was rejected by the supreme court. In Curtis, the panel
reasoned that the combination of separate and community funds over time
(separate down payment, community payments on the note) produced an
immovable with a mixed title (52.5% community, 47.5% separate). Though the
supreme court decision goes off on other grounds (the payments on the notes
were found to be community funds), the supreme court rejected the appellate
court's analysis. It stated:
The Court of Appeal was in error in holding the property part commu-
nity and part separate. While other community property states may
32. See La. Civ. Code art. 2366.
33. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 3, § 3.40, at 54 (Supp. 1992).
34. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 3, § 5.6.
35. 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981).
1994]
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categorize property paid for in part with separate funds and in part with
community funds as mixed, Louisiana does not do so.
36
The court also stated:
These cases, among others, also establish that property declared to be
separate at acquisition does not change character if a subsequent credit
payment is made with community funds. Proof that the community
contributed to the purchase of separate property would only created [sic]
a debt on the part of the wife's separate estate to the community for the
amount of community funds used. It would not convert the property or
any portion of it to community property. Only when community and
separate funds are mingled in the initial acquisition may the property be
regarded as community.
37
II. MATRIMONIAL AGREEMENTS DURING MARRIAGE
In re Boyer38 is an important decision confirming the ease and simplicity
of the process for contracting a matrimonial agreement during marriage. The
court gives a straightforward application of Article 2329's provision that spouses
"may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modifies or terminates a
matrimonial regime during marriage only upon joint petition and a finding by the
court that this serves their best interests and that they understand the governing
principles and rules."
The lower court granted a summary judgment that the agreement was invalid
because of (1) the failure of the judge to hold a hearing with the parties present
and (2) the signing of the agreement by the parties before it was approved by the
court. The court of appeal reversed and held the procedure used was sanctioned
by Article 2329.
In Boyer, both the husband and wife were represented by independent
counsel at the time they executed, before a notary and two witnesses, an
agreement terminating their community regime and establishing a separate
property regime. (They also executed a partition of their existing community
assets, an agreement that is not subject to the requirements of Article 2329
because it is not a matrimonial agreement. 39) The attorneys submitted the
36. Id. at 57-58.
37. Id. at 59.
38. 616 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 882 (1993). The author of this
article assisted counsel for Mr. Boyer early in the process of this case but did not participate in the
briefing or arguing of the case at trial or on appeal.
39. The first agreement partitioning community property is valid without court approval, and as




agreement signed by the spouses and a joint petition to the judge. In an
affidavit, the spouses stated "that they had sought legal counsel, they had read
the petition and the agreement, they understood the rules and principles involved,
and that the agreement was in their best interests. Neither party requested a
hearing or appeared before the court." 4 The district judge read the documents
and found that the spouses understood the document and that it was in their best
interests.
Stating that the legislative goal of Article 2329 was that of protecting the
less worldly spouse and preventing that spouse from entering into disadvanta-
geous agreements that were not fully understood,4 the court reasoned that the
presence of the attorneys advising the spouses was adequate to meet that goal.
The policy did not require a full-fledged hearing to determine the issues. Also,
because the article does not specify a time sequence, it was not required that the
parties wait until after judicial approval to sign the documents.
The court's holding is supported by the text of the legislation and the basic
policies it reflects. The totality of the law governing this problem is Article
2329. It states the whole of the procedural and substantive requirements: (1)
joint petition; and (2) finding (of fact) by a court that (a) the agreement serves
the spouses' best interests, and (b) that they understand it. Nothing is stated
about the order in which documents must be executed, before or after the judicial
finding. The article does not deal with the time of execution, but with the
necessary steps for validity. For example, comment (b) refers to the fact that
before the marriage, "spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement." But, of
course, the agreement is not valid until the marriage. The agreement can be
executed, but its effectiveness is dependent on the subsequent condition
occurring.
It was important under the prior law to complete the documents before
marriage because once married spouses could not contract with each other. To
be consistent, one should conclude that because agreements during marriage are
allowed, the parties can execute the documents at any time, but the agreement
will not be valid until the judicial finding is made. Certainly, there is no
prohibition against obtaining court approval first and then executing the
documents. The Civil Code simply states the substantive standard, and the only
procedural rules comprise the reference to a joint petition and a judicial finding.
During the existence of the community property regime, the spouses may, without court
approval, voluntarily partition the community property in whole or in part. In such a case,
the things that each spouse acquires are separate property. The partition is effective
toward third persons when filed for registry in the manner provided by Article 2332.
Regardless then of when the document was executed, and regardless of when the judge made his
findings, the partition of then existing assets is valid and enforceable. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note
3, § 8.10; Noel J. Darce, Comment, Student Symposium-Analysis and Interpretation of the New
Matrimonial Regimes Law-Interspousal Contracts, 42 La. L. Rev. 725, 733-34 (1982).
40. Boyer, 616 So. 2d at 731.
41. Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuels, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Modifications
of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 La. L. Rev. 83, 90-91 (1979).
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There is no requirement of a personal appearance before the judge. There
is no requirement of a particular kind of order or kind of judgment. Article 2331
further demonstrates the flexibility contemplated. A matrimonial agreement can
be by act under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses. That
procedure contemplates execution of the agreement by the parties at one time,
and then at a later time, the acknowledgment before a notary making it valid.42
More basically, the text does not refer to a court "authorization" to give the
parties some kind of "capacity." All it requires is a "finding by the court" that
the parties understand the agreement and that it serves their best interests.
Indeed, the dispositive event is not the court's order or judgment. At bottom is
the contract of the parties. That contract is the juridical act that changes the
regime. The court's finding simply supplies the formality that allows the
contract to produce its effects.
III. CLASSIFICATION-TAX PLANNING MEETS MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Reeves v. Reeves43 rests so heavily on facts-respecting the fact finding of
the lower court that the presumption of community was not overcome-that it
is likely to have little precedential value. However, it is worth some attention
because the problems it raises are serious and likely to recur. Indeed, it was
perhaps inappropriate for the court of appeal to have relied so heavily on a fact-
based analysis. The dispute involved little uncertainty about the facts that did
occur, and the problem involved legal and policy issues more than factual ones.
In Reeves, parents engaged in estate planning and tax avoidance transactions
desired to transfer a farm to their four children. Rather than executing a simple
donation of the property, they executed a credit sale, transferring to each child
a one-fourth interest in the farm in exchange for a series of $6,000 promissory
notes payable annually. In subsequent years, the parents forgave part of the debt
by canceling the notes at a rate of $6,000 per year to take advantage of the
maximum gift tax annual exclusion then in existence." After several years, all
of the notes were canceled and the children received the farm without having
paid anything to their parents. The transfer was accomplished without payment
of any gift tax. The transaction also accomplished the transfer to the children
of any appreciation in the property, as is often contemplated in this type of estate
planning transaction.
The trial court found that the presumption of community was not overcome,
presumably because the form of the transaction was a sale. However, the normal
approach in this kind of case is not based on form, but on the intent of the donors.
The issue is whether the parents' cause or motive was a spirit of liberality, or
42. La. Civ. Code art. 1833; Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 3, § 8.6.
43. 607 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 1010 (1992).
44. I.R.C. § 2503 (1978).
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whether it was to engage in an onerous transaction.45 Although the facts of the
case are not described at length in the opinion, usually the cause or motive of
elderly persons engaging in estate planning transactions is to minimize taxes.
Accomplishing that goal normally requires transfers of property to heirs. An
onerous transfer that keeps an equivalent value in the donor's estate defeats that
goal. Only a gratuitous transfer of some kind satisfies it. Indeed, the amount and
timing of payment of the notes should be almost conclusive proof of an intent to
transfer the property also without payment of gift tax by taking advantage of the
annual exclusion.46 In Reeves, the proof of this intent was even stronger because
the parents treated their four children equally, such equality normally being
evidence of desiring to benefit the children individually and not the children's
spouses.
Under this analysis, a court would not be bound by the form of the act or the
designation of the transaction as a sale rather than a donation.47 Overlooking the
formal designation and focusing on the real substance of the transaction is common
practice in litigation in this area. Donations, especially, are treated as valid if they
meet the form requirements for such transfers, even though they are couched as
sales.48 Such "simulations" were common practice for many years to protect third
persons in good faith from forced heirship claims. 4
9
Perhaps one might be inclined to apply a type of "dirty hands" estoppel against
persons who hide their intent by the use of a different form. Common and
widespread acceptance of such practices, however, would seem to preclude a moral
condemnation of them. Even so, that notion should not govern under the Reeves-
like fact scenarios. It is highly likely that the donors and their lawyers choose the
form of transaction, and not the children who are the beneficiaries of it.
If one turns away from the technicalities of cause and its role in classifying
transactions and looks perhaps to more realistic policy concerns, one might
speculate about policies related to spousal sharing that might have influenced the
Reeves court. The basic policy notion of spousal sharing is that spouses share the
accumulations of their work and skills exercised during their marriage under a
community regime. At the same time, they do not share that which comes to them
without such work. The Civil Code's primary examples of such unshared assets are
inheritances and donations. In Reeves, there were no facts indicating use of the
spouses' labor, their funds, or their skill to produce the interest in the farm.
45. See Allen v. Allen, 539 So. 2d 820 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 541 So. 2d 840 (1989).
46. I.R.C. § 2503 (1993).
47. Cf. Comeaux v. Noel, 251 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 259 So. 2d 68 (1971).
The lower court looked at the intent of the transferors and held it was a donation although it was in
the form of a sale. The court of appeal looked at the intent, found it was to compensate for the
daughter caring for the parents, and held it was actually a sale. In neither analysis did the court focus
on the form. Instead, they pursued the inquiry into the intent of the donors. Also, in Roberts v.
Roberts, 304 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), the form of the name on the credit union account
was not decisive.
48. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 499 So. 2d 1050, 1055 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
49. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1502, et seq. (1870).
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It might be argued that their common "creditworthiness" was used in acquiring
the asset, inasmuch as if the notes, admittedly valid, were sought to be enforced,
they could be enforced against community assets. Presumably, the parents could
have changed their minds, or their creditors or a bankruptcy court could have
enforced the notes. However, as the facts developed, these events did not occur,
and it would appear that the community contribution in this regard was "inconse-
quential" in the terms of'Article 2341. Indeed, the same court, in dealing with
another item in dispute in Reeves, held that a much more substantial community
contribution was inconsequential. 0
Another policy concern might be management of the asset until the notes were
all forgiven. As a sale, even if it was to the wife, it could have been designated to
be her separate asset. Her obligation would have been a separate one. If the
husband concurred in the acquisition, he would be estopped from claiming
otherwise. If it was a simple sal6 to her, third persons might be concerned about
whether it was community and whether she had the power to alienate or encumber
it. That inconvenience would be rather small though, and cured by the husband's
participation in transfers. In any event, this inconvenience was not a serious
problem in Reeves because the asset was an undivided interest in property with
three siblings, resulting in little likelihood of transfers of this asset in the ordinary
course of affairs. There was little chance of harming third persons by considering
this a separate asset of the wife.
Another strong policy concern violated by Reeves is the policy of keeping
family-derived property in the family. The result in Reeves involves the donee
spouse's losing half of her interest in the family farm and making the ex-husband
a possible co-owner with the former wife's siblings. This result would seem to be
inconsistent with the supreme court's recent emphasis on the nature of family
property and forced heirship in Succession of Lauga.5' It also seems inconsistent
with Civil Code article 2341.1, adopted in order to prevent a Martinez v. Martinez-
type result when an inherited interest in property was transmuted into a community
asset, and the property was put in the hands of the ex-wife and out of the husband's
family.5
2
In any event, Reeves is a beginning of an analysis of these problems and not
the final solution. The supreme court denied writs in the case, and it remains an
open question.
IV. FRAUD OR BAD FAITH MANAGEMENT
In Landry v. Landry,5 a husband received 110,000 shares of stock as
compensation for his work for a small corporation. Apparently before and after
50. Reeves v. Reeves, 607 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 602 So. 2d 1010 (1992).
51. Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993), reh'g denied.
52. See Hargrave, supra note 27.
53. 610 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
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some shares had been issued, the employer proposed and the husband signed a
restrictive agreement that provided that if the employee separated from his wife or
left the company, the company could repurchase all the stock for ten cents per share
for each year of the husband's employment with the company.
When presented with the agreement, defendant took it home and discussed
it with plaintiff. She was fully aware of the terms of the agreement and
only requested that defendant try to get an unrelated provision changed by
American [the corporation] before he signed it. Defendant had the
provision changed and then signed the agreement.
5 4
There was no suggestion that the changes in the restrictions were proposed by
the husband or for his benefit. Presumably, the agreement was a device for the
company to insulate itself from the domestic problems of its employees and to
encourage the employees to stay with the company. There was no showing that the
husband, upon the company's exercising its rights, unfairly benefitted. The money
produced by the repurchase was a community asset subject to partition. The court
implicitly concluded that execution of such agreements, at least with the spouse's
knowledge and apparent failure to object, is not sufficient to constitute fraud or bad
faith management. Indeed, though not discussed, there was no indication of any
damage suffered by the wife. She claimed to be damaged to the extent of the
difference in the amount received and the market value of the stock. However, it
would be difficult to prove the value of stock subject to such restrictive transfer
agreements. Perhaps fraud or bad faith could be involved if it could be shown that
such agreements, when triggered by divorces, could be used to harm the interest of
the non-employee, while granting the employee some other, perhaps disguised,
increased benefits.
In Landry, marital difficulties resulted in the husband' s not being in possession
of the stock certificates, "and [he] was apparently unable to obtain them from
plaintiff."55 The corporation then canceled those certificates in the husband's
name56 and reissued them. At that point, the husband turned in those new
certificates and received $88,000. The proceeds were invested by the husband in
a certificate of deposit in the names of both parties. However, he did not tell the
wife of the repurchase or the existence of the certificate. The court also stated that
it was not fraud or bad faith for the husband to fail to tell his wife about the events.
"Failure to disclose this transaction to plaintiff simply does not amount to fraud or
bad faith by the defendant." '57
54. Id. at 1050.
55. Id.
56. Since he was the registered owner, he would have the exclusive right to manage the shares
of stock. See La. Civ. Code art. 2351.
57. Landry, 610 So. 2d at 1050.
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